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New York’s Decanting Statute: 
Helping an Old Vintage Come to 
Life or Spoiling the Settlor’s Fine 
Wine? 
 
David Restrepo* 
 
Introduction 
 
The avid wine drinker has many tools at his disposal to 
maximize the experience of a wonderful bottle of wine. These 
tools include specially crafted glassware in different shapes 
and sizes, and the ever-popular wine decanter.1 The decanter 
serves many functions, and its pros and cons are debatable, but 
one of the recognized uses is the aeration of the wine, which 
arguably allows a wine to quickly “come to life.”2 Similar to 
wine, trust assets may need modification in order to realize 
their full potential. It might be that the trust would operate at 
its best if it existed for an additional period of years beyond its 
original purpose, or that a new trust serves the beneficiaries 
better by taking advantage of tax benefits.3 The year 1992 was 
a historic year for estate planners in New York, as a tool very 
 
  * J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Montclair 
State University. I would like to thank my family and friends for their 
continued support throughout the writing process. I am grateful to Professor 
Bridget Crawford for her support and guidance navigating a challenging and 
entertaining topic. Finally, thank you to all my colleagues on the PACE LAW 
REVIEW for their hard work and dedication to the publication of this 
Comment. 
1. A decanter is defined as “a vessel, usually an ornamental glass bottle, 
for holding and serving wine, brandy, or the like.” Decanter, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/decanter (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
2. Joseph Nase, Proper Transference Makes Wine Taste Better. So Pour it 
Out!, NEW YORK MAG., 
http://nymag.com/restaurants/articles/wine/essentials/decanting.htm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
3. For a discussion of the various benefits of decanting a trust, see infra 
Part III. 
1
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similar to the wine decanter became available for the use of 
trust assets. The 1992 addition of section 10-6.6 of the New 
York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (“NY EPTL”) marked the 
first state statute to allow the “pouring” of trust assets from 
one trust into another.4 
Estate planning presents several challenges to attorneys 
and trustees who face the dilemma of serving their client’s 
interests by anticipating future effects on their assets. Utilizing 
trust decanting provisions has become a critical tool for a 
trustee when determining how to best serve a client’s interests 
for various reasons such as protection of assets from tax 
ramifications, or modification of existing trusts to create better 
utility. Acknowledging these practical utilities, decanting has 
left several questions unanswered: Is the decanting process a 
blatant slight to the traditions that New York State has held 
dear in the field of Trust and Estate law? Why are estate 
planners using a utility that currently sits in limbo as far as an 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) determination on what the 
eventual tax ramifications and treatment will be? While 
addressing what could be a major forthcoming issue on tax 
treatment of decanting, this Comment explores section 10-6.6 
of the NY EPTL,5 the history behind the amendments, and the 
various practical uses decanting offers to the modern estate 
planner. Furthermore, and most importantly, this Comment 
examines the overlooked clash between the New York 
legislature’s granting of seemingly unbridled power in trust 
reformation with New York’s longstanding commitment to 
honoring a settlor’s intent.6 The decanting statute and its 
modern use have disregarded the original intention of the 
statute, which was to allow estate planners to preserve the 
benefits of the Generation Skipping Transfer (“GST”) tax 
exemptions.7 Moreover, the reach of this statute has now 
 
4. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 
2014). For a discussion of the legislative history, see infra Part I.B. For a 
discussion of the functionality of the statute, see infra Part II. 
5. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6. 
6. For a discussion of case law that demonstrates New York’s 
longstanding commitment to preserving settlor intent in the area of Trusts 
and Estates, see Part IV.B. 
7. See Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries, in EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6 [hereinafter Turano, Practice Commentaries]. For 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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placed it in complete conflict with New York’s commitment to 
preserving settlor intent. 
The Comment examines trust decanting in four parts. Part 
I reviews the historical evolution of decanting statutes, first 
from common law roots, and later focusing on the legislative 
history of New York’s decanting statute. Part II briefly explains 
the functionality of section 10-6.6 of the NY EPTL; the “how 
does it work” explanation of the statute that authorizes 
decanting. Part III will discuss the many practical uses of the 
decanting statute. Finally, Part IV will transition into a 
discussion on how the trustee’s use of this statute not only 
leaves him in limbo regarding the tax treatment of his actions, 
but places him in a head on clash with New York’s 
longstanding commitment to honoring settlor intent. 
 
I. The History of Decanting: How Did We Get Here? 
 
A. Common Law Roots 
 
The power to decant developed through common law, with 
the statutory authority essentially “putting flesh on the bones 
of an existing common law trustee power.”8 The power that the 
trustee wields through decanting is evident in modern 
statutory authority, but courts initially granted this power 
through common law determinations that still hold true in 
states not utilizing statutory authority.9 The first American 
case to recognize the existence of this power as widely 
accepted10 is Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Company.11 
 
 
 
a discussion of the Generation Skipping Transfer tax, see infra Part III.A. 
8. Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and its Alternatives: Remodeling and 
Revamping Irrevocable Trusts, 55 S.D. L. REV. 253, 255 (2010). 
9. Examples of these states include New Jersey and Iowa. For a 
discussion of case law from these states, see infra notes 21-50 and 
accompanying text. 
10. Simmons, supra note 8, at 255-56; see also Farhad Aghdami & 
Jeffrey D. Chadwick, Decanting Comes of Age, 23 PROB. PRAC. REP. 1, 2 
(2011). 
11. 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940). 
3
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1. Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Company 
 
The background of the Phipps case involved an irrevocable 
trust created by Margarita C. Phipps for the benefit of her four 
children, and named Palm Beach Trust Company and John S. 
Phipps, her husband, as co-trustees.12 The trust instrument 
provided that John S. Phipps, as the individual trustee, had 
“sole and absolute discretion” of the trust estate, including 
“directing the payment of the entire trust estate” to one or 
more of the beneficiaries.13 The issue in the case arose when 
John Phipps directed the corporate trustee to transfer the 
estate into a new trust for the benefit of the original 
descendants of the donor, with the added wrinkle that a 
provision be added for the payment of income to the wife of 
John H. Phipps, the grantor’s son and one of the original 
beneficiaries, if he provided so in his will.14 Palm Beach Trust, 
unsure if this transfer “was within the scope of . . . powers 
granted in the original trust . . . [,] brought . . . suit in equity 
[seeking] . . . construction of the original trust.”15 “[T]he 
Chancellor ruled that the individual trustee was authorized to 
create the second trust and [directed] the corporate trustee to 
[follow the orders of the individual trustee].”16 
The case was appealed by one of the original beneficiaries17 
and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, noting that “[i]f a 
trustee has a special power of appointment, that is a power to 
appoint among the members of a specified class, whether he 
can effectively appoint a trustee for members of the class 
depends upon the terms of the power vested in him.”18 The 
court reasoned that the “unlimited confidence and discretion in 
the individual trustee . . . clothed him with absolute power to 
administer and dispose of the trust estate to anyone of the 
named beneficiaries to the exclusion of the others.”19 Once the 
 
12. Id. at 300. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 300-01. 
17. Simmons, supra note 8, at 257. 
18. Phipps, 196 So. at 301 (citation omitted). 
19. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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court acknowledged the power afforded to the trustee, it had no 
difficulty finding that the trustee could create a trust with the 
sole limitation that one of the descendants of the donor in the 
original trust be named a beneficiary.20 The court justified its 
decision by acknowledging the “absolute power” afforded the 
trustee in allowing the trustee to move the trust estate into a 
new trust, but as discussed below, New York has enhanced this 
power by no longer requiring absolute discretion.21 
 
2. In re Estate of Spencer 
 
Interpretation of the decanting power continued in Iowa, 
which uniquely recognized the power through case law before 
codification through statute.22 In re Estate of Spencer23 involved 
the construction of the will of Fern Spencer, who left her 
children a life estate in a trust funded by farmland she owned 
with the remainder going to her grandchildren.24 Her husband, 
L.J. Spencer, was appointed as trustee with the “power to 
dispose of the real estate by will or deed” when he distributed 
his own farm land, the larger section of the parcel, in the same 
manner as Fern’s land.25 If any of Fern and L.J.’s children died 
childless, “the share of such child went to his or her surviving 
brothers and sister.”26 Her husband survived Fern for another 
twenty-eight years and did not exercise the power of 
appointment throughout his lifetime.27 In his will, he appointed 
the property in the original trust created in Fern’s will along 
with the remaining property owned by him into a new trust 
created through his will for the benefit of his four children for 
as long as the law would allow.28 The trial court found that the 
appointment power exercised in L.J.’s will violated the terms of 
the original trust because L.J.’s attempted exercise of power 
 
20. Id. 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. Simmons, supra note 8, at 255. 
23. 232 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1975). 
24. Id. at 493; Simmons, supra note 8, at 257-58. 
25. In re Estate of Spencer, 232 N.W.2d at 493. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 494. 
28. Id. 
5
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exceeded the authority granted in the trust and that Fern’s 
intent, being the granting of a life estate to her children and 
remainder to her grandchildren, was being frustrated.29 
On appeal, the court confronted the issue of whether L.J.’s 
exercise of the power of appointment exceeded the authority 
granted by Fern.30 The court identified L.J.’s power of 
appointment as a special power31 which is an important 
distinction in deciding whether he could use this power 
through the appointed trust.32 The Iowa court examined section 
17 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and stated that a 
trust may be created by “appointment by one person having a 
power of appointment to another person as trustee for the 
donee of the power or for a third person”33 and examined 
further the comments which allowed the donee of a special 
power to appoint interests to trustees for the benefit of objects 
unless the donor had manifested a contrary intent.34 The court 
recognized that there were “plausible, logical, and persuasive” 
arguments on both sides, but held that nothing in Fern’s will 
“manifest[ed] a contrary intent.”35 This led the court to affirm 
and reverse in part, holding that L.J. could use the power of 
appointment to create the trust, but by the terms of the trust 
creation which designated that the trust continue as long as 
possible, it would violate the intent of Fern which was that her 
grandchildren receive the property at the death of her 
children.36 The decision invites two differing interpretations. 
Read narrowly, the decision would allow a trustee who is 
granted special power of appointment, to exercise that power 
through an outright appointment or through a trust 
instrument, so long as “the grant of the power does not 
 
29. See id. at 494-95. 
30. Id. at 495. 
31. Id. at 496. The court, citing to the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 
320 (1940), stated that an appointment “power is special if (a) it can be 
exercised only in favor of persons, not including the donee, who constitute a 
group not unreasonably large, and (b) the donor does not manifest an intent 
to create or reserve the power primarily for the benefit of the donee.” In re 
Estate of Spencer, 232 N.W.2d at 496 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
32. In re Estate of Spencer, 232 N.W.2d at 496. 
33. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17 (1959)). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 497. 
36. Id. at 499. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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expressly prohibit it.”37 A broad reading would allow the 
“trustee to decant trust property to a new trust unless plainly 
prohibited by the terms of the original trust.”38 
 
3. Wiedenmayer v. Johnson 
 
Wiedenmayer v. Johnson39 involved an inter vivos trust 
established by a father for the benefit of his son.40 John Seward 
Johnson established a trust for his son, John Seward Johnson, 
Jr., which was funded by Johnson & Johnson stock worth $18 
million.41 The trustees were directed to pay net income from 
the trust to John Seward Johnson Jr. or his guardian ad litem 
“from time to time and whenever in their absolute and 
uncontrolled discretion they deem it to be for his best 
interests,”42 and the property was deemed “to be his absolutely, 
outright and forever.”43 The trustees decided to “condition the 
distribution [made to John Seward Johnson Jr.] upon his 
setting up a substituted trust” for the funds to which he 
agreed.44 
The disposition was challenged by the guardian ad litem 
for John Seward Johnson, Jr.’s children who argued that the 
disposition would eliminate their contingent remainder 
interest.45 The court did not seem deterred by this outcome 
instead focusing on the power afforded in the trustees in the 
original trust instrument.46 The court based its reasoning on 
the “absolute discretion” bestowed on the trustees to make 
decisions based on “the son’s best interests.”47 The court 
reasoned that it could “not substitute [its own] opinions as to 
the son’s ‘best interests,’ as opposed to the opinion of the 
 
37. Simmons, supra note 8, at 260. 
38. Id. 
39. 254 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969). 
40. Id. at 535; Simmons, supra note 8, at 260. 
41. Wiedenmayer, 254 A.2d at 535. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 536. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 535-56. 
7
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trustees” who had the ultimate discretion on this point.48 The 
court did find it necessary to discuss that the trustees likely 
based their decision on the matrimonial problems that John 
Seward Johnson, Jr. was facing, noting that it is not always a 
pecuniary interest that serves as the best interest of the 
beneficiary, but rather the granting of “peace of mind” may be 
sufficient so long as the trustees deemed it in the best interest 
of the beneficiary.49 
The dissent took issue with the majority’s decision, arguing 
that there was no disposition and what had occurred was an 
“impermissible alteration of the substantive trust terms.”50 The 
dissent found the actions of the trustees and John Seward 
Johnson, Jr. to be a scheme concocted to remove his children as 
contingent remaindermen and instead have him create a new 
trust mirroring the terms and reverting the interest back to the 
trustees.51 In understanding Wiedenmeyer, it should be noted 
that both the dissent and majority recognized the issue as an 
examination of the “construction and breadth of the trustee’s 
distribution powers.”52 The notable difference between the 
decisions in Spencer and Phipps and the decision in 
Wiedenmayer is that in the latter there was no “specific power 
of appointment” being analyzed.53 Wiedenmayer is the first case 
to consider decanting power not as a specialized power of 
appointment prescribed by a trust, but rather as an “implied 
trustee distribution power.”54 Even so, as will be discussed 
further in the next subpart, New York chose to enable 
decanting through the powers, among them the power of 
appointment, which are discussed in Spencer and Phipps.55 
 
B. The Legislative History of Section 10-6.6 of the NY EPTL 
 
As previously discussed, some states allowed decanting 
 
48. Id. at 536. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. (Conford, J., dissenting). 
51. See id. at 537. 
52. Simmons, supra note 8, at 262. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See infra Part I.B. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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through common law interpretation of power of appointment56 
or implied power of a trustee.57 Codification of decanting 
through the enactment of section 10-6.6 of the NY EPTL 
marked the first state enacted legislation that permitted 
decanting.58 Jonathan Blattmachr, a renowned New York 
attorney from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, authored 
New York’s decanting statute, based on forms he used in 
practice, in an attempt “to create maximum flexibility.”59 
Support for a decanting statute was founded on the idea that 
the common law already authorized this power60 and that 
legislation was simply codifying “the existing common law 
theories underlying a trustee’s special power of appointment.”61 
New York principally enacted the decanting statute “to confirm 
the authority of a New York trustee to exercise an invasion 
power in further trust [Generation Skipping Transfer] 
purposes,”62 but numerous other purposes were subsequently 
recognized and approved by New York courts.63 
In 1992, sections (b) through (e) were added to the existing 
power of appointment found within the NY EPTL.64 Section 
(b)(1) gave a trustee who had absolute discretion to invade a 
trust for the benefit of an income beneficiary or beneficiaries, 
the power to appoint the principal of the trust into another 
instrument provided the consent of all interested persons was 
given.65 This appointment could be done without prior court 
approval so long as the fixed income interest of any beneficiary 
 
56. See supra notes 11-38 and accompanying text. 
57. Wiedenmayer v. Johnson, 254 A.2d 534, 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1969); see also supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. 
58. Diana S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of 
Decanting-Obtaining and Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288, 289 
(2009). 
59. See Dan W. Holbrook, Can’t Trust a Trust? Decant!, 40 TENN. B.J. 20, 
21 n.3 (Aug. 2004); see also Simmons, supra note 8, at 271. 
60. Alan Halperin & Michelle R. Wandler, Decanting Discretionary 
Trusts: State Law and Tax Considerations, 29 TAX MGMT. EST. GIFTS & TR. J. 
219, 225 n.45 (2004). 
61. Simmons, supra note 8, at 271. 
62. Zeydel & Blattmachr, supra note 58, at 290. 
63. Id. 
64. Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 591, sec. 2, § 10-6.6, 1992 N.Y. Laws 3520, 
3521 (codified as amended at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2014)). 
65. § 10-6.6(b), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
9
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was not reduced,66 the exercise was in favor of the 
beneficiaries,67 and there was no violation of the limitations 
imposed by NY EPTL 11-1.7.68 Section (b)(2) allowed a court 
with proper jurisdiction to direct a trustee to appoint the trust 
in a similar fashion following a petition by the trustee and 
notice to interested parties.69 Sections (c) through (e) discussed 
commissions of a trustee,70 writing requirements,71 and 
definitions of those requiring notice of the decanting.72 
Section 10-6.6 of the NY EPTL has been amended three 
times since 1992. The 1995 amendment added paragraph (f), 
which defined the power in section (b) as a special power of 
appointment and acknowledged the limitations of the rule 
against perpetuities,73 thus supporting the common law 
justification and parallel comparison with the property law 
power to invade principal.74 The 2001 amendment75 responded 
to IRS Treasury Regulation § 26.2554(b)(1)(ii), which exempts 
trusts from the GST only if a trustee could make distributions 
without the consent of beneficiaries.76 The amendment 
removed any requirement of consent from beneficiaries in order 
to keep the benefit intact.77 
Many states followed suit and enacted their own decanting 
statutes based upon New York’s version.78 While many of these 
states had similar provisions to the New York statute, others 
began to pass more permissive decanting statutes which did 
not require unlimited discretion to use the power.79 The 2011 
 
66. § 10-6.6(b)(1)(A), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
67. § 10-6.6(b)(1)(B), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
68. § 10-6.6(b)(1)(C), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
69. § 10-6.6(b)(2), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
70. § 10-6.6(c), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
71. § 10-6.6(d), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
72. § 10-6.6(e), 1992 N.Y. Laws at 3521. 
73. Act of Aug. 2, 1995, ch. 479, sec. 1, § 10-6.6(f), 1995 N.Y. Laws 3332 
(codified as amended at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 
2002 & Supp. 2014)). 
74. Halperin & Wandler, supra note 60, at 224. 
75. Act of Aug. 20, 2001, ch. 204, sec. 1, §§ 10-6.6(b)-(d), (g), 2001 N.Y. 
Laws 1482 (codified as amended at EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6). 
76. Turano, Practice Commentaries, supra note 7. 
77. Id. 
78. See Simmons, supra note 8 at 272-73. 
79. See id. (discussing several states who lacked a requirement of 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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amendment brought the New York decanting power back to the 
forefront of modern decanting statutes.80 As previously 
discussed, the Legislature opened up the statute to enable 
decanting at a greater level, “believ[ing] it was too constricting 
to allow invasion for the purpose of creating another trust only 
when the trustee had absolute discretion.”81 Looking at the 
history of New York’s decanting statute, it is evident that New 
York has made a great effort to remain a leading state in trust 
and estate law. The statute has gone through several 
evolutions and the most recent amendment attempts to keep 
New York in its leading role.82 
 
II. Operation and Mechanics of Decanting Statutes 
 
Different states have enacted decanting statutes, and each 
statute offers a different range of power to the trustee.83 
However, this Comment is focused on examining the New York 
decanting statute specifically. The 2011 amendment to the New 
York decanting statute is an example of the expansion of 
decanting power and the reestablishment of New York as a 
preeminent decanting state.84 
Prior to discussing the operation of the statute, it would be 
useful to describe the terminology used when referring to the 
statute. The New York statute defines the terms for the 
purposes of the section in subsection (s).85 The statute refers to 
both an “appointed trust,” and an “invaded trust.”86 
Additionally, the statute also makes reference to the term 
 
“unlimited discretion.”). 
80. Ivan Taback & Nathaniel W. Birdsall, The Ongoing Evolution of New 
York Trust Decanting, 247 N.Y. L.J. S2, S2 (2012). 
81. See Margaret Valentine Turano, Supplementary Practice 
Commentaries, in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2002 & 
Supp. 2014) [hereinafter Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries]. 
82. See supra notes 57-81 and accompanying text. 
83. See generally Simmons, supra note 8, at 271-73 (discussing different 
state decanting statutes). 
84. Act of Aug. 17, 2011, ch. 451, § 10-6.6, 2011 N.Y. Laws 1300 (codified 
as amended at N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2002 & 
Supp. 2014)); see also Taback & Birdsall, supra note 80, at S2. 
85. See EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(s). 
86. Id. § 10-6.6(s)(1), (6). 
11
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“principal.”87 The appointed trust is the trust that the principal 
is extracted from and the invaded trust is the trust that 
receives the trust principal.88 Looking at it through the lens of 
a tangible example, the appointed trust serves as the 
“decanter,” the invaded trust is the bottle of wine, and the 
principal is the wine itself.89 An “authorized trustee” as to the 
invaded trust, is the trustee who has authority to utilize the 
decanting power authorized by statute.90 When the statute 
refers to a “current beneficiary or beneficiaries,” the reference 
is to “the person or persons (or as to a class, any person or 
persons who are or will become members of such class) to 
whom the trustees may distribute principal at the time of the 
exercise of the power.”91 The statute also defines “unlimited 
discretion” as “the unlimited right to distribute principal that 
is not modified in any manner.”92 This definition is further 
enhanced by dispelling any limitation on “unlimited discretion” 
through words defining the power such as “best interests, 
welfare, comfort, or happiness.”93 The remainder of the terms 
defined in subsection (s) will be discussed as they are 
encountered. 
The statute begins with a subsection that essentially 
derived from prior statute and codifies existing case law.94 
Subparagraph (a)(1) is essentially stating that when the 
decanting power is exercised beyond the allowable scope, the 
power “is valid to the extent it is allowed, and invalid as to the 
excess.”95 The following subsection, (a)(2), allows the power to 
be used to a lesser extent than allowed, unless the donor has 
provided otherwise.96 The power to decant itself is more fully 
authorized in subsections (b) and (c) as discussed below.97 
 
87. Id. § 10-6.6(s)(8). 
88. Id. § 10-6.6(s)(1), (6). 
89. For the definition of a wine decanter, see supra note 1. 
90. See EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(s)(6). 
91. Id. § 10-6.6(s)(4). 
92. Id. § 10-6.6(s)(9). 
93. Id. 
94. Turano, Practice Commentaries, supra note 7. 
95. Id. (citing Hillen v. Iselin, 39 N.E. 368 (N.Y. 1895); In re Will of 
Block, 598 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1993)). 
96. Id. 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 98-116. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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The 2011 amendment essentially “create[d] two categories 
of decanting power, depending on whether the trustee has 
unlimited or limited discretion to invade principal on behalf of 
a beneficiary.”98 Subsection (b) as amended, continues to 
describe the power an authorized trustee with unlimited 
discretion has to invade trust principal, and appoint that 
principal to a new trust.99 The power allotted to a trustee with 
unlimited discretion as outlined in subsection (b) is not new to 
the amendment.100 When the trustee has unlimited discretion 
in the invaded trust, “the appointed trust must be for the 
benefit of one, more or all of the beneficiaries of the invaded 
trust, but not necessarily all” of them.101 Specifically, the 
trustee is not bound to include the same beneficiaries of the 
invaded trust and is authorized to exclude one or more 
beneficiaries.102 
Subsection (c) represents the major change in the 2011 
amendment,103 which extends decanting power to a trustee 
with “power to invade trust principal but without unlimited 
discretion.”104 An example of limited discretion would be a trust 
created by the settlor for the health, education, maintenance 
and support of the beneficiary.105 The trustee may still use 
appointment powers, but the appointed trust must retain the 
current beneficiaries from the invaded trust, as well as the 
successor remainder beneficiaries.106 This language also applies 
to a class designation, in which “the beneficiary or beneficiaries 
 
98. Taback & Birdsall, supra note 80, at S2. 
99. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(d) (McKinney 2002 & 
Supp. 2014). 
100. See Taback & Birdsall, supra note 80, at S2. 
101. Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, supra note 81. 
102. Id. 
103. Act of Aug. 17, 2011, ch. 451, sec. 2, § 10-6.6(c), 2011 N.Y. Laws 
1300 (codified as amended at EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(c)). 
104. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(c). 
105. This specific example refers to a support trust which is defined as 
“[a] discretionary trust in which the settlor authorizes the trustee to pay to 
the beneficiary as much income or principal as the trustee believes is needed 
for support, esp. for ‘comfortable support’ or ‘support in accordance with the 
beneficiary's standard of living.’” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1654 (9th ed. 
2009). 
106. MARTIN W. O’TOOLE ET AL., HARRIS 5TH EDITION N.Y. ESTATES: 
ESTATE PLANNING & TAXATION § 11:86 (5th ed. 2012). 
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of the appointed trust may include present or future members 
of the class.”107 The trust must also “include the same language 
authorizing the trustee to distribute the income or invade the 
principal of the appointed trust as in the invaded trust.”108 
Additionally, if the trustee chooses to extend the life of the 
appointed trust beyond the applicable period of the invaded 
trust, the trustees must be given “unlimited discretion to 
invade the principal of the appointed trust” during the term 
that extends beyond the original term of years.109 Lastly, if the 
invaded trust granted power of appointment to a beneficiary, 
the appointed trust must include this power, and the class of 
permissible appointees must remain the same as originally 
authorized in the invaded trust.110 
The remainder of the statute contains provisions common 
to trustees with both unlimited and limited discretion.111 In 
both instances, the authorized trustee has a fiduciary duty 
when exercising the power, to do so in the best interests of one 
or more beneficiaries, and must exercise the power “as a 
prudent person would exercise the power under the prevailing 
circumstances.”112 Like the pre-amendment statute, any 
invasion of the trust must still honor the settlor’s wishes.113 
Essentially the trustee “cannot exercise the power . . . if there 
is substantial evidence that the creator would not have wanted 
the change.”114 Language in the original trust that “generally 
prohibit[s] amendment or revocation alone” is insufficient to 
serve as the required “substantial evidence.”115 Lastly, and the 
most important point to this Comment, the trustee can exercise 
the power without the consent of the creator, beneficiaries, or 
without court approval, “provided that the authorized trustee 
may seek court approval” after giving notice to all those 
 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. See id. 
112. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(h) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 
2014). 
113. Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, supra note 81. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. For a discussion of potential issues with this standard see infra 
Part III. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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interested in the invaded trust.116 
 
III. Examining the Many Practical Uses of Decanting 
 
It would be imprudent to avoid acknowledging the many 
practical uses that decanting offers to the trustee. As 
previously addressed, section 10-6.6 of the NY EPTL was 
passed to allow a trustee to take advantage of the available 
GST tax exemptions available.117 But estate planners soon 
began to utilize the decanting statute to take advantage of a 
multitude of different tax benefits beyond its original purpose. 
These uses gained approval from the New York courts 
subsequent to the enactment of the statute.118 
 
A. Generation Skipping Transfer Tax 
 
26 U.S.C. § 2601 states, “[a] tax is hereby imposed on every 
generation-skipping transfer.”119 The GST tax is essentially a 
tax on both outright gifts and transfers in trust that are 
defined as “inter vivos direct skips.”120 The IRS defines an inter 
vivos direct skip as a transfer that is: (1) “[s]ubject to the gift 
tax,” (2) “[o]f an interest in property,” and (3) “[m]ade to a skip 
person.”121 The gift must meet all three requirements to be 
subject to the GST tax.122 
A transfer being subject to the gift tax, is more clearly 
defined in Schedule A of IRS Form 709 which indicates which 
transfers are classified as taxable gifts.123 GST may also affect 
nontaxable gifts if they are made to a trust for the benefit of an 
 
116. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6(j)(1). 
117. See supra notes 7, 61-63, 75-77 and accompanying text. 
118. Zeydel & Blattmachr, supra note 58, at 290-91. 
119. 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). Title 26 of the United States Code is the 
Internal Revenue Code. See Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with 
DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition Complicates State Income Taxation of 
Same-Sex Relationships, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 33 (2012). 
120. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY , INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 709 7 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i709.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 709]. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. at 6-7. 
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individual unless: “1. [d]uring the lifetime of the beneficiary, no 
corpus or income may be distributed to anyone other than the 
beneficiary, and 2. [i]f the beneficiary dies before the 
termination of the trust, the assets of the trust will be included 
in the gross estate of the beneficiary.”124 
After determining whether the transfer is subject to the 
gift tax, a determination must be made on whether the transfer 
consists of an interest in property, and whether it is made to a 
“skip person.”125 This is done by first ascertaining whether the 
“the donee is a ‘natural person’ or a ‘trust.’”126 The IRS 
definition of a trust for determining GST eligibility is more 
encompassing than the traditional definition127 used by 
practitioners: 
 
For purposes of the GST tax, a trust includes not 
only an ordinary trust, but also any other 
arrangement (other than an estate) that 
although not explicitly a trust, has substantially 
the same effect as a trust. For example, a trust 
includes life estates with remainders, terms for 
years, and insurance and annuity contracts. A 
transfer of property that is conditional on the 
occurrence of an event is a transfer in trust.128 
 
Natural persons are those who have an interest in the property 
 
124. Id. at 7. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. The more common definition of a trust is: 
 
The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial 
enjoyment of property to which another person holds the 
legal title; a property interest held by one person (the 
trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit 
of a third party (the beneficiary). For a trust to be valid, it 
must involve specific property, reflect the settlor's intent, 
and be created for a lawful purpose. The two primary types 
of trusts are private trusts and charitable trusts. 
 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1647 (9th ed. 2009). 
128. INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 709, supra note 120, at 7. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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transferred to a trust as defined by the IRS.129 The interest in 
the property can be either “a present right to receive income or 
corpus from the trust (such as an income interest for life) or is 
a permissible current recipient of income or corpus from the 
trust,” including persons who possess a general power of 
appointment.130 
The last requirement of the GST tax involves the 
determination of who is a “skip person” for purposes of the 
transfer.131 A donee, who is a natural person, is considered a 
skip person if the person is “two or more generations below the 
generation assignment of the donor.”132 For more complex 
determinations of the generation of the donee and donor, the 
IRS includes direction on whether or not the donee has a 
familial relationship.133 If the donee is a trust and all the 
interest in property is held by skip persons, or no interests in 
the property are currently held and the future interests are 
only held by skip persons, then the trust is considered a skip 
person.134 
When utilizing the decanting statute, a trustee’s primary 
concern with the GST tax is whether decanting will cause the 
trust that is currently exempt from GST taxation to lose its 
GST exempt status.135 The exemption can either result from 
the trust having “grandfathered status” from before the 
institution of the GST tax, or from the allocation of a GST 
exemption.136 Decanting is a useful tool in this area because it 
allows a trustee to appoint the exempt trust corpus into a new 
trust, thus extending the period in which the trust would be 
exempt from the tax.137 This tool is allowed through the 
 
129. Id. at 7-8. 
130. Id. at 8. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. 
134. Id. 
135. Aghdami & Chadwick, supra note 10, at 7. 
136. See id.; see also Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., An Analysis of the 
Tax Effects of Decanting, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 141, 166 (2012); 
Michael M. Gordon, Presentation to ALI-CLE Estate Planning in Depth at 
University of Wisconsin Law School: Use of State Decanting Statutes to 
Modify Irrevocable Trusts (June 26, 2013), available at http://files.ali-
cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/TSVB14_chapter_01_thumb.pdf. 
137. 5-10 R. MARK DAVIS, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: EPTL ¶ 10-6.6[2][b] 
17
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Treasury Regulations, which “provide a set of rules and ‘safe 
harbors’ for grandfathered trusts in order to ensure that a 
decanting or modification of a grandfathered trust does not 
jeopardize [the] GST exempt status.”138 Treasury Regulation 
sections 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)139 and 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D)140 
provide these safe harbors, making the decanting tool an 
extremely useful mechanism for trustees. This benefit is also in 
line with New York’s initial intended purpose for decanting.141 
 
 
 
 
(2013). 
138. Michael M. Gordon & Daniel F. Hayward, Presentation to Delaware 
Banker’s Association: The Tax Consequences of Decanting: A Summary of the 
Gift, Estate, Income and Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Considerations 
When Utilizing Delaware’s Decanting Statute (Apr. 13, 2012), available at, 
http://gfmlaw.com/sites/default/files/pdfs/2012TaxConsequencesOfDecanting.
pdf; see Aghdami & Chadwick, supra note 10, at 7-8. 
139. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A) (2004). Entitled the 
“Discretionary Test,” the Regulation provides that: 
 
[D]ecanting will not taint GST-exempt status if the 
following conditions are satisfied: when the trust became 
irrevocable, either the terms of the trust instrument or local 
law (i.e., common law or state statute) authorize[d] the 
trustee to make distributions to a new trust; neither 
beneficiary consent nor court approval is required; and the 
new trust will not suspend or delay the vesting on an 
interest in trust beyond the federal perpetuities period, 
which is measured from the date the trust becomes 
irrevocable to the later of (i) some life in being plus twenty-
one years or (ii) ninety years. 
 
Aghdami & Chadwick, supra note 10, at 7. 
140. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D) (2004). If the decanting does not 
satisfy the “Discretionary Test,” the decanting may still satisfy the 
“Modification Test,” if it “does not shift a beneficial interest in the trust to a 
beneficiary occupying a lower generation than the person holding the interest 
under the original trust; and does not extend the time for vesting of any 
beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided in the original 
trust.” Aghdami & Chadwick, supra note 10, at 7. 
141. Holbrook, supra note 59, at 21 n.3; see also DAVIS, supra note 137, 
at ¶ 10-6.6[2][a][2] (discussing In re Genovese, 224 N.Y. L.J. 30, 30 (2000), a 
decision of the Nassau County Surrogate’s Court where the court allowed a 
trust to be decanted into six separate trusts to preserve a GST exemption). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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B. Trust Situs 
 
The “situs” of a trust is the place where a trustee performs 
their active duties.142 Trust situs “is determined by an 
interpretation of the words by which the trust is created” along 
with other factors such as “the parties’ intention, the trustee’s 
place of business or domicile, and the location of the trust 
res.”143 Of these factors, “the settlor’s intent, if it can be 
ascertained, has been increasingly emphasized.”144 
Additionally, if the settlor selects a bank or trust company to 
act as trustee, the state where either is located is held to be the 
situs.145 If the foregoing rule is inapplicable, other 
circumstances may be considered such as “the domicile of the 
settlor, the situs of the trust res, or other similar 
circumstances.”146 This has led to differing holdings on the 
importance of the place of execution of the trust instrument, or 
the domicile of the beneficiaries.147 
The importance of trust situs ties directly into the 
beneficial use of decanting for many reasons. Different states 
look to generate revenue in different ways, and one of these 
ways is “enacting laws to attract business.”148 Grantors, 
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries now focus on identifying which 
states provide greater protection or flexibility on several 
different issues.149 Several of these important issues include 
the lack of a rule against perpetuities enabling the maximum 
optimization of tax exemptions for GST, no state income tax on 
gains for non-grantor trusts, privacy on trust provisions and 
assets for grantors or beneficiaries, greater asset protection 
 
142. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 224 (2013). 
143. Id. “Trust Res” is another term for corpus which is defined as “[t]he 
property for which a trustee is responsible; the trust principal.” BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 395 (9th ed. 2009). 
144. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 224 (2013). 
145. Id. This also holds true if the principal office of the bank or trust 
company is used to determine the situs. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Douglas Moore, Situs Shopping, TR. & EST., Jan. 2010, at 33, 
available at, http://wealthmanagement.com/practice-management/situs-
shopping-0. 
149. Id. 
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against creditors, greater flexibility to use decanting 
mechanism, and greater allowance of a modification of trust 
provisions.150 
Noting all these important issues that estate planners are 
monitoring, decanting can be an important tool in changing the 
situs of a trust.151 By changing the situs of a trust one might be 
able to capitalize on several tax benefits, or obtain more 
flexibility for the trust.152 An example of this would be “if 
property of an irrevocable trust is administered in [a state] for 
the benefit of [that state’s] residents, trust property could be 
decanted to a trust with a situs in another state that does not 
tax income of a trust administered for the benefit of 
nonresidents.”153 Even if the trust itself does not allow a change 
of a trust’s situs or principal place of administration, decanting 
can still “be used to modify the trust to permit changes to the 
trust’s governing law, situs, or principal place of 
administration.”154 
 
B. Modifying a Trust to Address a Change in Circumstance 
 
In addition to the various tax benefits realized by the use 
of trust decanting, the mechanism serves other valuable 
functions to the modern estate planner. It may become 
apparent that a trust no longer serves its purpose properly in 
the eyes of the attorney or the beneficiary. Various 
circumstances may arise that could not possibly be foreseen by 
the settlor of the trust, and may warrant a change to the 
instrument to better reflect common trends and usefulness. 
Different scenarios present a strong justification for 
attorneys to make the decision of advising their client to 
decant. One such circumstance that has prompted decanting 
includes the change of realistic and beneficial investment 
options that are limited by the terms of a trust. An example 
 
150. Id. 
151. William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An 
Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 15 (2010). 
152. See id.; see also Moore, supra note 148, at 33-34. 
153. Culp & Mellen, supra note 151, at 15. 
154. Id. at 15-16. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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might be a trust that has limited its investments to United 
States stocks or bonds, which in today’s world, is a very limited 
form of investment and arguably does not constitute the best 
use of the principal in the trust.155 By decanting the assets of 
the trust into a new appointed trust, the trustee could broaden 
the scope of allowable investments and thus make better use of 
the principal. 
An attorney might also advise the use of decanting if the 
circumstances of the beneficiaries have changed since the time 
of the trust’s creation. This scenario can present itself in a 
multitude of ways. One such scenario might be the creation of a 
trust by the settlor to care for his family for life. At some point 
that family line may dwindle to one person who does not care 
to have children, at which point if the last beneficiary passes, 
the corpus would go to distant relatives.156 Decanting the trust 
would allow the beneficiary to modify the terms if he/she so 
chooses, and have the principal pass to a charity or other 
beneficiary of his choosing.157 A trustee may also choose to 
utilize decanting power to: 
 
[L]imit[] distributions to beneficiaries with 
substance abuse problems or those engaging in 
other unproductive behaviors; transfer[] assets to 
a special needs trust for a disabled beneficiary; 
limit[] beneficiary rights to obtain information 
about the nature and extent of their trust 
interest by moving assets to a state . . . where the 
trustee’s duty to provide such information can be 
restricted; divid[e] single “pot” sprinkle trusts 
into separate trusts for each branch of the 
family; or eliminat[e] a beneficiary altogether.158 
 
There is also the possibility that the financial 
circumstances of the beneficiaries have changed, thus 
warranting a change in the distribution of the trust’s principal. 
 
155. See Arden Dale, Getting Personal: Rule Book to Decant Trusts May 
Change, DOW JONES NEWSWIRE, June 18, 2012. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Aghdami & Chadwick, supra note 10, at 3. 
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If a trust is set to pay two children, one who is wealthy and 
another who is not, the trust can be modified through the use 
of decanting to better care for the less fortunate beneficiary.159 
This example is one of the many issues that is discussed 
further in the following section as a possible harm realized by 
the use of decanting.160 
 
IV. The Inherent Flaws of Decanting 
 
Along with the many useful functions of decanting that 
were discussed in the previous part comes uncertainty, and 
perhaps a call for reflection, on whether decanting conforms 
with past protections of settlor intent. The justification for 
allowing decanting is clear through the many uses that 
trustees have found for the function. But sensible thought asks 
that the legal scholar and practicing attorney reflect on what 
the potential impact and implications are of allowing such 
power. Additionally, trustees remain in limbo regarding the 
potential tax consequences of their action. Although an answer 
regarding this treatment appears to be forthcoming from the 
IRS, it may be an answer that trustees are not happy to hear. 
 
A. Uncertainty of Tax Ramifications 
 
On December 27, 2011, the IRS issued Notice 2011-101 in 
Internal Revenue Bulletin 2011-52, requesting comments 
 
[R]egarding when (and under what 
circumstances) transfers by a trustee of all or a 
portion of the principal of an irrevocable trust 
(Distributing Trust) to another irrevocable trust 
(Receiving Trust), sometimes called “decanting,” 
that result in a change in the beneficial interests 
in the trust are not subject to income, gift, estate, 
and/or generation-skipping transfer (GST) 
 
159. Dale, supra note 155. This example assumes that the invaded trust 
specifies that the beneficiaries are to receive equal distributions from the 
trust. 
160. See infra Part IV.B. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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taxes.161 
 
Previously, the IRS had issued private letter rulings [“PLRs”] 
on transfers resulting in a change in beneficial interests,162 but 
the notice stated that there would be no further PLRs while the 
issue was under study.163 
The Treasury Department and the IRS invited comments 
from the public on “relevance and effect of the various facts and 
circumstances . . . [and] other factors that may affect the tax 
consequences.”164 The Treasury Department and IRS identified 
the following 13 potential facts and circumstances that might 
potentially affect one or more tax consequences: 
 
1. A beneficiary’s right to or interest in trust 
principal or income is changed (including the 
right or interest of a charitable beneficiary); 2. 
Trust principal and/or income may be used to 
benefit new (additional) beneficiaries; 3. A 
beneficial interest (including any power to 
appoint income or corpus, whether general or 
limited, or other power) is added, deleted, or 
changed; 4. The transfer takes place from a trust 
treated as partially or wholly owned by a person 
under §§671 through 678 of the Internal Revenue 
Code (a “grantor trust”) to one which is not a 
grantor trust, or vice versa; 5. The situs or 
governing law of the Receiving Trust differs from 
that of the Distributing Trust, resulting in a 
termination date of the Receiving Trust that is 
subsequent to the termination date of the 
Distributing Trust; 6. A court order and/or 
approval of the state Attorney General is 
required for the transfer by the terms of the 
Distributing Trust and/or applicable law; 7. The 
 
161. I.R.S. Notice 2011-101, 2011-52 I.R.B 932 [hereinafter IRS Bulletin 
2011-52]. 
162. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200607015 (Feb. 17, 2006). 
163. IRS Bulletin 2011-52, supra note 161. 
164. Id. 
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beneficiaries are required to consent to the 
transfer by the terms of the Distributing Trust 
and/or applicable local law; 8. The beneficiaries 
are not required to consent to the transfer by the 
terms of the Distributing Trust and/or applicable 
local law; 9. Consent of the beneficiaries and/or a 
court order (or approval of the state Attorney 
General) is not required but is obtained; 10. The 
effect of state law or the silence of state law on 
any of the above scenarios; 11. A change in the 
identity of a donor or transferor for gift and/or 
GST tax purposes; 12. The Distributing Trust is 
exempt from GST tax under §26.2601-1, has an 
inclusion ratio of zero under §2632, or is exempt 
from GST under §2663; and 13. None of the 
changes described above are made, but a future 
power to make any such changes is created.165 
 
After Notice 2011-101 was issued, several agencies submitted 
comments suggesting different forms of tax treatment on each 
of the issues identified.166 
Despite the comments submitted by these different 
organizations, in Internal Revenue Bulletin 2013-1,167 the IRS 
declined to make a ruling, and stated that “rulings or 
determination letters will not be issued until the service 
resolves the issue through publication of a revenue ruling, a 
revenue procedure, regulations or otherwise.”168 By doing so, 
the IRS has essentially left estate planners with no answer 
 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Letter from Sharon Klein, Chair, Comm. on Trusts, 
Estates & Surrogate’s Courts, N.Y. City Bar & Brit L. Geiger, Comm. on 
Estate & Gift Taxation, N.Y. City Bar, to Internal Revenue Serv. (on file with 
author), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072279-
CommentstotheIRSonNotice2011-101.pdf; Letter from Louis A. Mezzullo, 
President, The Am. Coll. of Trust & Estate Counsel, to Internal Revenue 
Serv. (Apr. 2, 2012) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.actec.org/Documents/misc/Mezzullo_Comments_04_02_12.pdf; 
Letter from Richard E. Piluso, President, N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified Pub. 
Accountants, to Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 19, 2012) (on file with author), 
available at http://www.nysscpa.org/commentletter/irs101.pdf. 
167. Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 5 [hereinafter IRS Bulletin 2013-1]. 
168. Id. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
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regarding the potential tax treatment of decanting a trust. The 
United States Constitution gives Congress the broad “[p]ower 
to lay and collect [t]axes” and does not limit this power to any 
particular circumstance.169 Knowing this, by advising clients to 
utilize decanting, there is a level of uncertainty as to how this 
action will be treated in a tax sense. The bulletin itself 
acknowledges that the IRS is withholding judgment for the 
moment on issues such as whether “a change in beneficial 
interest is a gift,”170 or whether “a change in beneficial interest 
[should result] i[n] the loss of GST exempt status or constitutes 
a taxable termination or taxable distribution.”171 However, this 
should not be understood to mean that the IRS has lost interest 
in decanting. Catherine Hughes, Attorney Adviser for the 
Treasury of Tax Legislative Counsel, stated that the IRS will 
focus on decanting “in a big way” and the comments that have 
been submitted are being reviewed.172 She also stated that 
“[t]he project was omitted from the plan because the IRS didn’t 
think it would be able to publish the rules by the end of this 
plan year.”173 
It is possible that “by understanding the risks and taking 
the proper precautions, a trustee may decant the assets of an 
irrevocable trust to a new trust with minimal tax 
consequences.”174 However, it still must be noted that “without 
due consideration of all relevant factors, the decanting could 
result in unintended tax consequences.”175 But even this 
thought presents a problem moving forward for a trustee. The 
landscape of decanting is riddled with uncertainty as to the tax 
ramifications. Even with “due consideration” there is no 
accurate predictor of how the IRS might treat these issues, as 
evidenced by the Service’s reluctance to accept the comments 
and issue a ruling. The IRS bulletin at least acknowledges that 
the Service is at least considering whether or not these 
 
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
170. IRS Bulletin 2013-1, supra note 167, at § 5, ¶ 23. 
171. Id. at § 5, ¶ 24. 
172. Marie Sapirie, ABA Meeting: Trust Decanting Rules Still Getting 
IRS Attention, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 13, 2013, available at Lexis 2013 TNT 
92-28. 
173. Id. 
174. Aghdami & Chadwick, supra note 10, at 4. 
175. Id. at 9. 
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transfers result in gifts, taxable terminations or 
distributions.176 But as Catherine Hughes has noted, the IRS 
has not forgotten about decanting.177 Whether this is good news 
or bad news is yet to be seen. Yet, as of the moment, trustees 
continue to freely utilize the decanting power, essentially 
stepping into the abyss of tax uncertainty. 
 
B. Frustrating Settlor Intent 
 
The Wiedenmayer dissent sets the premise of this subpart 
by acknowledging “the potential controversy of trust decanting 
as well as its true breadth and power.”178 Section 10-6.6 of the 
NY EPTL allows the modification of a trust if the trustee can 
demonstrate that the settlor would likely have made the 
change.179 Generally speaking, trust law in the United States 
has historically recognized “the settlor’s intent []as the defining 
force in trust law — the ‘polestar’ which guided all aspects of 
trust administration.”180 There were few exceptions to the 
general rule “limited to cases where a trust provision 
encouraged illegal activity, fostered immorality, or otherwise 
violated public policy.”181 Beyond the rare exception, the settlor 
made the decision on what provisions and terms would best 
 
176. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
177. See Sapirie, supra note 172. 
178. Simmons, supra note 8, at 261. 
179. See Turano, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, supra note 81. 
180. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, The Uniform 
Trust Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 
1171 (2008) (citing In re Sherman Trust, 179 N.W. 109, 112 (Iowa 1920)). 
181. Id. The author cites to several cases for each exception to the 
general rule. For an example of an unenforceable settlor intention to promote 
illegal activity, see In re Estate of Sage, 412 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769 (Sur. Ct. 
Albany County 1979) (“A trust is a legal device which provides for the use of 
one's funds for others in a specified manner. As a legal device, it comes within 
the ambit of our legal system. As such, it cannot become a vehicle for illegal 
conduct or activity.”). For an example of an unenforceable trust provision 
fostering of immorality, see Kingsley v. Broward, 19 Fla. 722, 745 (1883) (“A 
trust for illegitimate children to be thereafter begotten will not be enforced, 
as being against good morals.”). And lastly, for an unenforceable settlor 
intent that violated public policy, see Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 20 A.2d 21, 
27-37 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (voiding provisions in a trust that obstructed the 
relationships of the settlor’s siblings). 
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serve the beneficiaries.182 
New York courts have made various decisions that indicate 
the settlor’s intent is always paramount in interpreting trust 
construction.183 For example, in 1929 the court in Holbert v. 
Jackson184 interpreted an instrument purporting to revoke a 
trust.185 The settlor wrote to a trustee expressing a desire to 
revoke a prior deed of a trust, but did not sign a formal 
revocation of the trust.186 The court found that there was clear 
evidence that the settlor “intended to revoke the [initial] trust,” 
which was fully revocable by the settlor.187 Furthermore, the 
settlor executed a different trust distributing shares of a 
company to different persons, and when the court was asked to 
again interpret the provisions of a trust and the discretion 
afforded a trustee it again acknowledged that “[t]he important 
consideration in construing the deed of trust is wherever 
possible to give effect to the intention and purpose of the 
settlor.”188 
In the case of In re Marine Midland Bank-Western,189 the 
Appellate Division stated that “[t]he settlor’s intention as 
expressed in the agreement is, of course, the most important 
consideration.”190 The court was analyzing provisions in the 
trust that called for distribution of the principal to the settlor’s 
seven different children.191 The controversy in the case dealt 
with whether or not the provisions in the trust established that 
the interests of grandchildren vest conditionally upon their 
survival to the termination of the trust or immediately upon 
the death of their parent.192 The court decided that the trust 
vested immediately upon the death of the parent, crafting its 
holding around the “settlor’s paramount concern” which was 
 
182. Cooper, supra note 180, at 1171-72. 
183. See infra notes 184-97 and accompanying text. 
184. 235 N.Y.S. 642 (Sup. Ct. 1929). 
185. Id. at 643-45. 
186. Id. at 643-44. 
187. Id. at 644. 
188. Id. at 645. 
189. 389 N.Y.S.2d 705 (App. Div. 1976). 
190. Id. at 707 (citation omitted). 
191. Id. at 706. 
192. Id. at 707. 
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“the encouragement of his bloodline.”193 
Various other cases involving trust construction 
demonstrate that historically the court has made the settlor’s 
intent the absolute most important factor in the interpretation 
of trust provisions.194 The notion is not limited to a historical 
context either, as courts still maintain this ideology in recent 
cases.195 Additionally, the protection of settlor/testator intent is 
not limited to trust construction, as it remains the most 
important factor in determining will provisions,196 and the 
creation of easements.197 Despite the evidence of New York 
courts’ deference to the settlor’s intent in these various 
proceedings, section 10-6.6 of the NY EPTL opens the door for a 
 
193. See id. at 706-08. 
194. See In re Hooker’s Trust, 233 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1962) 
(stating that “[t]he paramount rule in the construction of inter vivos as well 
as testamentary trusts is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the trust 
settlor or testator” in determining the proper beneficiaries); In re Glorney’s 
Trust, 109 N.Y.S.2d 898, 908 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (pointing out that the 
fundamental problem in a trust construction was “ascertaining the intent of 
the creator of the estate” in determining if the settlor had created “a 
remainder interest in his heirs or reserved a reversion for himself.”); In re 
Estate of Petty, 357 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595-97 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1974) 
(following the reasoning that “the intention of the grantor [is] paramount” in 
determining that the settlor did not intend on including adopted children as 
beneficiaries). 
195. See In re Myers, 845 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (App. Div. 2007) 
(acknowledging the grantor’s intent as the most important consideration 
when determining that the respondent could not be compelled to transfer 
property immediately); In re Rivas, No. 2000 LT 00007/B., 2011 WL 32792, at 
*4 (N.Y. Sur. Monroe County Jan 5. 2011) (stating that the “the efforts of the 
court should always be directed toward the discovery of the intent of the 
settlor as it is expressed in the instrument” when determining whether an 
advisory committee could act without the permission of a trustee) (citation 
omitted); In re Kline Revocable Trust U/A Dated September 9, 1971, 763 
N.Y.S.2d 721, 726-27 (Sur. Ct. Fulton County 2003) (ascertaining the settlor’s 
intention through surrounding circumstances to determine which trust 
document best reflected the settlor’s wishes in regards to differing payment 
provisions). 
196. See In re Estate of Singer, 920 N.E.2d 943, 946 (N.Y. 2009) (stating 
that “[t]he paramount consideration in will construction proceedings is the 
testator's intent” when determining whether or not to enforce a clause in the 
testator’s will) (citation omitted). 
197. See Busch v. Harrington, 880 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (App. Div. 2009) 
(stating that the determination of whether an easement was created was 
determined based on the intention of the parties and identifying the 
important indicators of a grantor’s intent). 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/10
  
2014] NEW YORK’S DECANTING STATUTE 507 
trustee to interpret this intent with little obstruction.198 As in 
the circumstance of the siblings who are in unequal financial 
position, who is to say the settlor intended to provide for them 
based on the financial situation at the time of distribution? In 
fairness, the settlor could have held the belief that both should 
receive an equal amount regardless of financial situation. 
Conceivably, the financial situation of the beneficiaries could 
change after the distribution of the principal. Is the trustee’s 
judgment to modify the trust reversible, or is the sibling who 
had the misfortune of a change in financial circumstance post-
distribution left with no remedy? 
This argument finds its basis in the idea that a trustee is 
operating with unlimited discretion, as even though the 
amendment affords those with limited discretion the right to 
decant, the beneficiaries cannot change.199 Even in the 
situation where unlimited discretion is afforded to the trustee 
to invade the principal, this power affords the trustee power to 
modify the beneficiaries initially set by the settlor.200 
Proponents of decanting might argue that this ideal is similar 
to following the grantor’s intent in a trust construction. 
However, the difference is that the construction involves 
interpretation of existing terms, while decanting involves a 
modification or change in the existing terms based on the idea 
that the settlor would take the same course of action. 
Furthermore, decanting is especially alarming because of the 
legislature’s removal of direct judicial oversight of the use of 
this power.201 The idea that a settlor would modify a trust to 
avoid potential tax consequences or to take advantage of tax 
 
198. This is evidenced by different objectives that decanting has been 
used to accomplish. Specifically, the scenario that modifies the interests of 
different beneficiaries is concerning in the context of honoring a settlor’s 
intent. For a more complete discussion of different modifications to trusts 
accomplished through decanting see supra Part III.C. Additionally, as 
previously mentioned, section 10-6.6(j) of the NY EPTL allows this 
modification without judicial, beneficiary or settlor oversight. See N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(j)(1) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2014); see also 
supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
199. Katherine E. Cauley & Britta L. McKenna, Broadening New York’s 
Decanting Statute; ‘Unlimited Discretion’ Makes a Principal Difference, 246 
N.Y. L.J. S1, S1 (2011). 
200. Id. 
201. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 10-6.6 (j)(1). 
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benefits is a simple concept to grasp. But to modify the 
interests of beneficiaries and the amount of beneficiaries under 
the premise that the settlor, who can no longer answer for 
himself, would choose to make the same change is drastically 
adverse to the idea of protecting their intent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The power to decant owes its creation to common law 
roots,202 but the New York legislature has opened up its power 
to an unimaginable level. A trustee with unlimited discretion 
in the trust is theoretically operating within the scope of the 
settlor’s intent because of the amount of power initially 
bestowed upon them. But is a trustee with “unlimited 
discretion” truly operating within the settlor’s intent when he 
modifies the beneficiaries that the settlor, presumably chose 
carefully at the time of the trust’s creation? The statute itself 
creates a situation where settlor intent is merely passed over to 
effectuate what the trustee believes should be done. Because 
there is no judicial oversight of the process, it essentially feels 
as if the court has abandoned its historical protection of the 
settlor’s intent. 
With the many benefits borne through the use of 
decanting, it appears to be here to stay. But does the statute 
allow a trustee too much power to essentially dispel the 
settlor’s original intentions? A solution would be to simply limit 
the use of trust decanting to a more certain use that is 
undoubtedly in line with the settlor’s intent, to avoid taxes or 
to capitalize on tax benefits. But even this use should leave the 
trustee weary in light of the uncertainty left by the IRS’s recent 
comments and action (or inaction). The obvious risk 
surrounding this uncertainty should lead the trustee, or 
attorney who advises the use of this action, to wonder if their 
actions might lead to the enjoyment of an exquisite vintage, or 
the disappointment of sipping vinegar. 
 
202. See supra Part I. 
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